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Taming Global Finance in an Age of Capital? 
Wage-Setting Institutions' Mitigating Effects 
on Housing Bubbles 
 
Alison Johnston* and Aidan Regan**  
Abstract 
Analyses in international political economy (IPE) identify interest rate convergence, 
magnified in the process of European monetary integration, and financial market 
liberalization as causal factors behind the rise of house prices.  Despite these common credit 
supply shocks, developed economies experienced heterogeneous trends in housing inflation 
throughout the 1990s and 2000s. Turning towards demand determinants of housing prices, 
we focus on whether wage-setting institutions blunt financial liberalization’s   impact   on  
housing inflation via their restraining effect on incomes.  Employing both a panel regression 
analysis and a structured comparison of housing developments in Ireland and the 
Netherlands, we uncover two findings. First, income growth is a more important predictor of 
housing  bubbles  across  OECD  economies  than  financial  variables    (although  income’s  impact  
on house prices is severely mitigated for the United States). Second, countries with 
coordinated labor market institutions that grant political coalitions in the export sector veto 
powers over non-tradable sector interests, realize more restrained income growth and, in 
turn, are less prone to housing bubbles. 
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Taming Global Finance in an Age of Capital? 
Wage-Setting Institutions' Mitigating Effects 




The 2006 United States (US) subprime mortgage crisis and subsequent 2008 
global financial crisis demonstrated the devastating effects of housing and 
asset price bubbles on national economies.  In addition to their destabilizing 
effects on the political economy at large, implosions of housing bubbles also 
have important equity implications.  Sudden declines in housing value can 
display regressive effects if disproportionate shares of poor households have 
a substantial proportion of their wealth stored in (subprime based) mortgages 
(Mian and Sufi, 2014). Likewise, Schwartz (2009) and Ansell (2014) have 
shown that the rise and fall of house prices has political effects on individual 
policy preferences toward the welfare state, redistribution, and government 
policymaking.  
 
Within the comparative and international political economy (IPE) literature, 
interest rate convergence, especially in the run up to the creation of European 
Monetary Union (EMU), and the mortgage-backed securitization associated 
with global financial liberalization, are generally cited as key instigators of 
housing bubbles within developed economies (Mosley & Singer 2009; 
Schwartz   2009;   Deeg   and   O’Sullivan   2009;   Kindleberger and Aliber, 2011; 
Rajan 2011; Helleiner 2011).  These two developments reduced the costs of 
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borrowing and increased the volume of debt instruments, introducing 
inflationary pressures in housing markets.  
 
Global financial liberalization and general reductions in nominal interest rates 
have   important   effects   on   households’   demand   for   borrowing.      However,  
accounts of these general trends, which tend to rely heavily on the US case1, 
fall short in explaining the wide variation in housing inflation within the 
OECD.  Financial liberalization and reductions in nominal interest rates 
impacted all advanced political economies since the end of the 1970s.   Despite 
this, housing bubbles emerged with noticeable irregularity, particularly in 
Europe. Some countries (Ireland, Spain, and the UK) witnessed considerable 
increases in housing prices during the 1990s and the 2000s, while others 
(Germany and Austria) witnessed average declines in nominal and/or real 
housing prices (OECD, 2012a; Bank of International Settlements, 2014). 
 
In this paper, we argue that a demand-side comparative political economy 
approach can better account for the rise of housing bubbles than supply-side 
international political economy (IPE) approaches.  We provide a sectoral 
class-based institutional argument behind the heterogeneous rise of housing 
bubbles within the OECD since the 1980s: countries that possessed labor 
market institutions that allotted the exposed sector, directly or indirectly via 
the state, agenda setting or veto powers in national wage-setting (i.e. export-
led political coalitions) rather than the sheltered sector (i.e. domestic-led 
political coalitions), realized more moderated income growth, which in turn 
mitigated   households’   demand   for   mortgages   and   national   housing   price  
growth.                                                           1 It is important to note that our dependent variable is housing prices not household debt. The USA had a subprime mortgage debt crisis that was associated with rising income inequality and financial products of securitization.  Aggregate house price increases, however, were not that different from the OECD average. 
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Using an ordinary least squares (OLS) and instrumental variable (IV) panel 
analysis of 17 OECD countries between 1980 and 2007, and a structured 
comparison of Ireland and the Netherlands, we uncover two findings.  First, 
(lagged) real income growth exhibits a much larger effect on housing inflation 
than (lagged) real interest rate reductions, while other domestic credit 
variables (expansions in domestic credit and capital account openness) as well 
as domestic political factors (government partisanship and central bank 
independence) display no significant association with housing prices.  This 
income effect is eliminated for the US when we introduce country-interaction 
effects but remains robust for other liberal economies, including the United 
Kingdom.  Second, countries that possess labor market institutions that 
enhance the bargaining power and interests of the exposed sector vis-à-vis 
unions in non-tradable sectors2 in national wage-setting, realized smaller 
increases in housing prices than countries where non-tradable sector unions 
exerted greater political influence on the bargaining process.   
 
Our results suggest that not only may domestic labor market institutions that 
govern income growth continue to trump the influence of broader 
international financial trends in the determination of housing bubbles within 
countries, but also that these institutions (and their underlying sectoral-class 
based coalitions) may play an important role in mitigating the worst effects of 
international financial liberalization on macroeconomic outcomes, especially 
outside the US.  Whilst we agree with Ansell (2014) that the contemporary 
macroeconomic importance of asset-markets, particularly housing, has so far 
been neglected in comparative study of social and economic policy 
preferences, we disagree that labor market institutions, and the underlying 
sectoral-class based interests that shape these, are unrelated to the political                                                         2 In this paper, we use the terms exposed and tradable sectors, and sheltered and non-tradable sectors, interchangeably.  
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The political economy of housing bubbles: Financial 
liberalization’s  destabilizing  effects? 
 
In the IPE literature on financial liberalization, many have identified a link 
between the loosening of international capital controls, mortgage 
securitization, the supply of (housing) credit, and the presence of asset 
bubbles (Rajan 2010; Helleiner 2011; Kindleberger 2008; Mosley & Singer 
2009).  Moreover, the harmonization of financial market rules among 
developed countries reduced regulatory uncertainty among foreign lenders, 
providing further incentives for lenders to increase credit supply (Jones, 
2014).  Access to steady international capital flows (funded by new 
“innovative”   financial  products)  provide  governments   and   households  with  
greater capacity to borrow due to higher credit volume.  Such access is not 
without its consequences. As credit becomes more available, increases in 
housing and asset prices can transform into prolonged bubbles, which inflate 
the   “true”   value   of   assets.   Capital   inflow   “bonanzas”,   which   are   highly  
conducive towards a rapid increase in household debt, are therefore 
associated with higher likelihoods of systemic economic crisis during periods 
of  “sudden  stops”  (Reinhart  and  Reinhart,  2008). 
 
Within the OECD, the increase in capital mobility also aligned with 
reductions in nominal interest rates, which made credit cheaper, particularly in 
Alison Johnston and Aidan Regan 
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Western Europe.3  In what now constitutes the nineteen economies of the 
Eurozone, the drive towards a single currency facilitated a radical shift 
towards a low inflation, capital-friendly regime. This began with the 
European  Monetary  System’s  (EMS)  fixed  Exchange  Rate  Mechanism (ERM), 
and was then extended in the 1990s, with the nominal Maastricht criteria for 
EMU membership.  Under the EMS, several European countries committed 
themselves to fixed exchange rates, which prompted them to initiate difficult 
wage and price adjustments in order achieve exchange rate convergence 
(Johnston, 2012; Johnston and Regan, 2014).  Such adjustments, at least among 
countries that made a credible commitment to the ERM (removing capital 
controls in the process) resulted in reduced exchange rate volatility, and 
subsequently interest rate convergence and nominal interest rate reductions.   
 
With the introduction of a common currency, exchange rate risk between 
European member-states was completely eliminated and, due to the 
undervaluation of default risk prior to the 2008 financial crisis, the average 
maximum spread in nominal interest rates on long-term government debt 
between 2000 and 2008 was 0.8% for the EMU12 (EU Commission AMECO 
Database, 2014).  Greater availability of credit and the reduced cost of 
borrowing that came with European monetary integration established an 
environment highly conducive towards increased private and public 
borrowing, which, through cross-national capital flows, became intimately 
connected to the liberalization of mortgage backed securities originating in 
the US (Schwartz 2009).  
                                                        3 Under the interest rate parity condition, foreign and domestic interest rates equalize in the presence of capital mobility only if the expected future exchange is roughly equivalent to the current exchange rate (and if default risks are similar).  This did not materialize in Latin American and East Asia, where exchange rates were volatile, and default risk was heterogeneous, but it did materialize in developed economies due to the rise of inflation targeting central banks, 
and	   in	   the	   case	   of	   the	  Western	   European	   economies,	   the	   European	   Monetary	   System’s	   fixed	  exchange rate regime. 
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In addition to these global financialization trends, recent CPE scholarship 
notes that differences in cross-national approaches to credit expansion further 
exacerbated  some  countries’  exposure to asset/housing price bubbles.  Duca et 
al (2010) and Fuller (2015) outline that countries with permissive credit 
regulatory frameworks were more exposed to debt accumulation and in turn, 
asset bubbles.  This argument has been further expanded in the welfare-state 
literature.  Schwartz (2012), Schelkle (2012) and Trumbell (2012), note that 
politicians’  support  for  credit  policies  promoting  home-ownership served as a 
substitute for the welfare state and caused some countries, particularly Anglo-
Saxon economies, to be overexposed to the 2008 financial crisis. 
 
Rethinking the supply-side bias of IPE and CPE accounts of housing 
bubbles 
 
Despite the importance of international credit expansion, these trends alone 
fail to fully account for the heterogeneity in housing bubbles among OECD 
economies.  Financial liberalization and reductions in nominal interest rates 
affected all advanced market economies in the 1980s and 1990s.  The level of 
capital   account  openness,   if  proxied  by  Chinn  and   Ito’s   (2006)   liberalization 
index,  was   identical   for   EMU’s   original   (1999)   entrants   by   1993,  with   Spain  
fully liberalizing its capital markets by 1994 (Karcher and Steinberg, 2012).4  
Likewise, all countries (including Germany) witnessed reductions in nominal 
interest rates between 1990 and 2000.  Despite these commonalities, housing 
price inflation since 1990 was remarkably heterogeneous.  For some countries 
(Ireland and Spain) destabilizing housing bubbles arose.  In other countries, 
house prices increased but did not transform into bubbles (Netherlands and 
                                                        4 Canada, Japan, the UK, and the US removed capital controls at the start of the 1980s, while Australia did so by 1985, Denmark by 1988, and Sweden by 1993 (Karcher and Steinberg, 2012). 
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Denmark).  Finally, in others (Germany, Austria, and Japan), nominal and real 
housing prices were relatively stagnant.   
 
Of course, one could argue that the timing of financial liberalization was not 
so homogenous across OECD economies, which varied somewhat throughout 
the 1980s and 1990s.  Countries that removed capital controls and committed 
themselves to monetary integration and hard currency regimes later 
witnessed more sudden reductions in nominal interest rates. Consequently, 
they may have been more prone to rapid asset price bubbles and irrational 
exuberance than countries that undertook these adjustment processes earlier. 
This argument, however, is not empirically validated when looking at the 
relationship between interest rate reductions and housing price growth. 
 
Figure 1 presents simple bivariate comparisons of differences in nominal/real 
interest rates, and percentage increases in nominal/real housing prices 
between 1990 and 2007 for 17 OECD economies.5  Reductions in nominal 
interest rates fail to correspond consistently with increases in nominal house 
prices. Spain, for example, witnessed a decline in nominal interest rates by 
over 10% between 1990 and 2007 and an increase in nominal housing prices 
by over 270%. On the other hand, Ireland and the Netherlands witnessed 
much smaller declines in their nominal interest rates (5.8% and 4.6%, 
respectively), but had more pronounced housing price increases (450% and 
300%, respectively). As will be highlighted in the case studies, much of the 
Dutch housing bubble occurred in the 1990s, while Dutch housing prices flat-
lined in the 2000s.   Similar inconsistencies arise when looking at real data: 
though countries like Japan, Germany, Sweden and US had similar reductions 
                                                        5 These include Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United States.   
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in real interest rates between 1990 and 2007, changes in housing prices were 
markedly different. 
 
Figure 1: Changes in Housing Prices (as a percentage of 1990 values) and 
differences in interest rates, 1990-2007 
 Housing price data from the OECD (2012a) except for Austria and Portugal whose housing price data stems from the Bank of International Settlements (2014); Nominal and real interest rate 
(using	  the	  GDP	  deflator)	  from	  the	  EU	  Commission’s	  AMECO	  database	  (2014). 
 
In regards to CPE accounts that focus on national regulations governing 
credit supply, changes in mortgage lending regulatory practices also fail to 
fully explain the heterogeneity in housing prices across the OECD.  Figure 2 
provides simple bivariate comparisons examining the relationship between 
2009 tax relief on debt financing of homeownership (higher values indicate a 
greater subsidy wedge between the market interest rate and the interest rate 
households pay after the tax subsidy) and nominal housing price increases 
between 2000 and 2007.6  Similar to the interest rate data, tax relief does a poor 
job at explaining housing bubbles before the 2008 financial crisis. Countries 
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Canada) had some of the lowest levels of tax relief for home ownership in the 
OECD, while countries with higher values of tax relief (Finland and the 
Netherlands) witnessed more repressed nominal housing growth between 
2000 and 2007 (as we explain below, Dutch housing prices stagnated during 
the  2000’s). 
 
Figure 2: Changes in Nominal Housing Prices (2000-2007) and tax relief for 
homeownership (2009) 
 Housing price data from the OECD (2012a) except for Austria and Portugal whose housing price data stems from the Bank of International Settlements (2014); Tax relief data from the OECD (2011). 
 
A similar picture emerges when examining the relationship between changes 
in maximum loan-to-value ratios and housing prices.  Figure 3 provides a 
bivariate comparison examining the relationship between maximum loan-to-
value ratio increases between 1990 and 2000 (the only years for which the 
OECD provides this data) and nominal housing price growth.  OECD 
economies exhibit no discernible patterns in increases in maximum loan to 
value ratios and nominal housing prices. For countries in which limits on 
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nominal housing price increases ranged from 2.5% to almost 100% during the 
same period.  Pre-empting the causal mechanism in our case studies, Ireland 
and the Netherlands demonstrate that countries with vastly different policies 
towards changing maximum loan-to-value ratios witnessed similarly rapid 
house price increases between 1990 and 2000.  
 
 
Figure 3: Changes in Nominal Housing Prices and maximum loan-to-value 
ratios (1990-2000) 
 Housing price data from the OECD (2012a) except for Austria and Portugal whose housing price data stems from the Bank of International Settlements (2014); Loan-to-value ratio data from the OECD (2011).   
Finally,   the  welfare   state   literature   on   policy  makers’   preferences   for   credit  
expansion, also fails to sufficiently explain the heterogeneity of housing 
bubbles in the OECD.  While we lack a precise measure of policy-makers’  
“preferences”  for  credit  expansion  (in  our  panel  analysis  below,  government  
partisanship has no significant impact on housing prices), we possess data for 
the share of credit (as a percentage of GDP) provided to the private sector by 
financial institutions: domestic credit (taken from the World Bank, 2014), 
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households and firms, purchases of non-equity securities, and trade credits 
and other accounts receivable that establish a claim for repayment.  Countries 
who prioritize credit expansion should witness greater increases in their 
domestic credit supply to GDP ratios.  However, though a slight positive 
relationship between private credit expansion and nominal housing prices 
exists between 1990 and 2007 (see Figure 4), this relationship is driven purely 
by Ireland7.  Countries that witnessed markedly different expansions in credit 
(i.e. the USA compared to Canada or Sweden) witnessed similar increases in 
nominal housing prices between 1990 and 2007.    
Figure 4: Changes in Nominal Housing Prices and Expansion in Domestic 
Credit (provided by financial institutions) to the private sector as a share of 
GDP (1990-2007) 
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Rethinking housing bubbles via a demand-centred 
perspective: The role of wage-setting institutions  
One feature that links the comparative and international political economy 
literatures on housing markets is their supply-side centrism.  While demand 
booms in the presence of cheap credit are acknowledged, there has not been a 
systematic explanation for why these booms fail to emerge everywhere, 
especially outside of the US case, which has dominated recent study on 
housing debt.    Microeconomic literature has identified a strong causal link 
between (permanent or stable) household income and mortgage demand 
(Ortalo-Magné and Rady, 2006; Davidoff, 2006).  Yet few look at more 
systematic institutional factors that might explain why income growth is more 
persistent in some countries but not in others, and the extent to which this 
fuels the pro-cyclical impact of a generalised low interest-rate credit shock. 
 
Recent (liberal) welfare state research (Trumbull, 2012) suggests that income 
growth and credit expansion may be substitutes (i.e. credit-for-welfare). 
Mitigated income growth requires households to take on more debt to 
maintain a given level of spending; hence, low income growth corresponds 
with higher demand for credit, and ultimately housing prices (in the US, this 
was further exacerbated by the permissiveness and prominence of subprime 
mortgages).  Though income stagnation overlapped with credit booms in the 
US (and the UK), this country, whose credit regulatory policies are heavily lax 
(see Fuller, 2015), may be a unique case, and does not adequately represent 
housing demand dynamics across other developed economies.  It is equally 
possible that income (which is one of the most important determinants of 
whether a household can take out a mortgage) and credit serve as complements 
rather than substitutes, as in the USA. Higher incomes enable households to 
Alison Johnston and Aidan Regan 
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take on more mortgage debt, as their loan-value to income ratio declines, 
placing upward pressures on housing prices.     
 
We draw upon labor market research in comparative political economy to 
examine whether income growth amplifies mortgage-credit demand and 
housing prices in the OECD at large.  We analyze the impact of domestic 
institutions that govern wage-setting on housing prices through their 
determination of income growth.  Labor market institutions have been 
frequently linked to wage moderation (Soskice, 1990; Hall and Soskice, 2001; 
Iversen & Soskice 2010; Johnston and Regan, 2014), and in turn inflation.  
Classical political economy literature highlights that encompassing, 
centralized and/or coordinated collective bargaining at the national level 
reduces the collective action problem among unions to push for higher wage 
increases, leading to persistent wage moderation.  
 
Given that labor market institutions impact inflation, we suggest that such 
political dynamics may also constrain housing bubbles through their impact 
on housing demand.  Coordinated wage setting institutions may have bubble-
mitigation effects for two reasons.  First, repressed income growth that stems 
from these institutions reduce domestic demand for all goods, including debt 
instruments required for purchasing major durable goods (i.e. home 
mortgages).  Second, since collective bargaining institutions can be relatively 
sticky   (i.e.   not   subject   to   frequent   change),   they  may   influence   households’  
future expectations of income growth.  If wage coordination mechanisms 
consistently deliver slow income growth in the past, households may expect 
that these institutions will continue to deliver wage moderation in the future, 
and adjust their demand for mortgages accordingly. 
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Recent political economy literature outlines the importance of sectoral 
dynamics when examining the influence of labor market institutions on policy 
preferences (Rehm & Wren 2014). Others have examined how sectoral 
coalitions influence aggregate wages and prices (Brandl, 2012; Johnston et al, 
2014). National demand is determined by income growth in two different 
types of sectors: tradable (export-oriented) and non-tradable (domestic–
oriented).  Wage-setters in the former have the incentive to restrain wage 
growth, because employers are less able to pass wage increases onto prices 
due to competitiveness constraints. If unions price wages too high, employers 
are more likely to respond with employment shedding rather than price 
mark-ups.  Wage-setters in the non-tradable sector, however, do not possess 
similar incentives as employers have greater leeway to pass on wage increases 
to prices (in the public sector, such wage increases can be passed onto/funded 
by taxes or borrowing). The conflicting incentives of these different sectoral-
class interests have important consequences for domestic inflation, yet the 
possible influence of these sectoral differences on asset-prices remains largely 
unexplored.   
 
Despite the fact that differences in sectoral-class interests exist within all 
political economies, some countries possess domestic labor market 
institutions that better contain the influence of the non-tradable sector in 
shaping aggregate wage outcomes. These countries have coordinated wage-
setting institutions that grant the export-sector, either directly or indirectly via 
state intervention, veto powers in the determination of national wages.  
Because export-based coalitions have the incentive to limit aggregate wage 
growth in sheltered sectors for competitiveness reasons, coordinated collective 
bargaining institutions that grant them the upper hand in wage negotiations 
make it easier for these interests to enforce their wage moderation preferences 
on the economy at large.  Such institutions frequently underpin export-led 
Alison Johnston and Aidan Regan 
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growth regimes but have generally been overlooked in IPE research on the 
macroeconomic roots of the international financial crisis. 
 
Building on previous work on sectoral-class politics (Brandl, 2012; Johnston et 
al, 2014), we suggest that there are three coordinated wage-setting regimes 
that grant greater agenda setting and veto powers to the export sector, 
thereby enhancing their political bargaining power vis-à-vis sheltered sector 
unions. These include: multi-employer pattern bargaining regimes where 
exposed sector firms act as trend-setters (Germany and Austria); state imposed 
coordination regimes that grant the government unilateral power to deliver 
(public sector) pay outcomes in line with export-sector preferences (France 
and Belgium), and; state-led wage pacts where the social partners bargain in 
the  state’s  shadow of hierarchy. These pacts grant the state the unilateral capacity 
to establish productivity-based wage ceilings (or, in times of crisis, wage 
freezes) if unions and employers fail to negotiate wage restraint (Finland and 
the Netherlands).   
 
x In pattern bargaining regimes, sectoral-class interests in the export 
sector (the metalworking sector for Germany and Austria) establish 
wage-settlements first. These then serve as the upper limit for all 
subsequent sectoral wage agreements in the wider economy.  The 
political strength of the export (manufacturing) sector in Germany and 
Austria stems from the prominence of this sectoral-class coalition in 
shaping their national export-led growth regime, which has been 
sustained in the face of globalization due to their value-added 
production niches (Hall and Soskice, 2001).   
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x State imposed coordination regimes allot the state a unilateral role in 
monitoring wage inflation in line with exposed-sector interests.  In 
France,   such   coordination   stems   from   the   state’s   use   of   the   collective  
agreements of large exporting firms, which then act as non-negotiable 
benchmarks for the public sector (Hancké, 2002).  In Belgium, the 
state’s   imposing role occurs through legislative statutory acts, which 
grant the government the capacity to intervene and cap wage growth if 
labor   costs   exceeds   that   of   the   average   of   Belgium’s   three   largest  
trading partners (France, Germany and the Netherlands). 
 
x The state’s  role  in  monitoring  wage  developments  in  the  interest  of  the  
export-sector also exists in countries with state-led wage pacts. These 
tripartite pacts grant the government the statutory means to control 
wage increases but are usually a temporary feature of collective 
bargaining. They do not result in direct unilateral state intervention, but 
rather indirect state action via its threats to intervene unilaterally if 
wage restraint is not delivered.  In the Netherlands, such wage pacts 
are used reactively in response to sudden increases in inflation and 
their terms involve either national wage ceilings or wage freezes, 
which are subject to legislative decrees if they are not met.   
 
Other wage-setting regimes fail to grant veto powers to the export sector, 
thereby weakening its agenda setting power vis-à-vis the non-tradable sector. 
These include:  peak bargaining regimes where both exposed and sheltered 
sector unions/employers are united under a confederal umbrella (Italy, Spain 
and Portugal); uncoordinated market-oriented regimes where individual 
wage-setters bargain independently with employers (the US and UK), and; 
non-state-led wage pacts where wage pacts are concluded between union and 
Alison Johnston and Aidan Regan 
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employer confederations but the state lacks the power to ensure collective 
compliance (Ireland).  
 
x In peak bargaining regimes, union confederations are unable to unify 
sectoral conflicts among competing affiliates.  If the public sector holds 
greater membership in these umbrella organizations than the export 
sector, peak bargaining can be more prone to inflation. Sheltered sector 
dominated peak bargaining regimes differ to exposed sector 
dominated peak bargaining regimes where the export sector continues 
to exert influence in the peak confederation, due to its higher 
membership representation.  In Denmark, for example, the 
manufacturing  sector’s  dominance  within  the  LO  has  been  maintained  
by the formation of the CO-Metal export cartel since 1992.   
 
x Uncoordinated market-oriented regimes are, politically, more sector-
neutral.  Individual firms set wage growth on par with productivity 
developments, which for the non-tradable sector is usually lower than 
the export sector.  However, such regimes do not have the capacity to 
deliver the degree of national wage suppression that exist in collective 
bargaining   regimes,   as   fragmentation   inhibits   employers’   capacity   to  
coordinate and moderate wage growth in all sheltered sectors.  
Additionally, these regimes have the capacity to be wage inflationary if 
income inequality leads to disproportionate wage increases at the upper 
end of the earnings distribution.  In the US and UK, these above-
productivity wage increases are common in high-skilled services such 
as finance and legal services.  
 
Taming Global Finance in an Age of Capital? 
   18 
x These coordination problems are also present in non-state-led wage 
pacts (Ireland prior to the crisis). These pacts are delivered by peak-
level confederations and their conclusion and enforcement relies upon 
the collective compliance of affiliates.  However, unlike state-led wage 
pacts, the state has little capacity to ensure that concluded wage levels 
stay within or below agreed limits.  In Ireland, where the dynamic 
multinational sector is non-unionized and hence relatively absent in 
the Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU), these regular wage pacts 
rest largely on the preferences of public sector unions (Culpepper and 
Regan, 2014).   
   
Appendix A provides the complete list of these wage-setting regimes and 
countries’  classifications  within  them  between  1980  and  2007.    Our  theoretical  
model rests on examining how these six wage coordination institutions (and 
their underlying sectoral-class interests) influence housing prices via income 
growth.  We hypothesize that wage-setting regimes that limit income growth 
in non-tradable sectors (pattern bargaining, state-imposed coordination and 
state-led wage pacts) are more prone towards moderated income growth.  
Such repressed income growth reduces the demand for mortgage credit, 
which in turn limits the demand for housing, mitigating the possibility that 
house price increases turn into housing bubbles.  Wage setting regimes that fail 
to moderate wage growth in the sheltered sectors (peak level bargaining non-
state-led wage pacts, and to a lesser extent uncoordinated regimes) are more 
prone towards inflationary income growth.  Such growth increases the 
demand for mortgage credit, which increases the demand for housing, 
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An institutional model of housing bubbles in the OECD: 
Empirical evidence   
Variables and Estimator 
 
We employ a panel analysis of 17 OECD8 economies from 1980 to 2007 to test 
whether income is more impactful in explaining housing price growth than 
financial factors.  Our baseline model stems from Aizenman and Jinjarak 
(2009), who examine the influence of current account balances on housing 
prices.  The authors use a (one year) distributive lag model to examine 
determinants of real-estate valuations for 43 countries between 1990 and 2005.  
Aizenman  and  Jinjarak’s  model   includes  only   lagged   independent  variables, 
rather than present value independent variables, because real-estate is a 
substantial investment for households, who must incur significant debt 
burdens to purchase these assets.  Therefore, changes in housing purchases 
that result from changes in income and interest rates are likely subject to 
greater delays than for other goods and financial assets.   
 
The   authors’   final   model   includes   only   one   year   lags   of   the   independent  
variable, although they acknowledge that the effects of current account 
balances persist up to five years. Below, we also present results for a two year 
distributive lag model (all independent variables are two years removed from 
the present value of the dependent variable), and the results are largely 
similar, except for population growth which becomes significant.  The impact 
of all our independent variables become insignificant within the third year lag                                                         8 These countries include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
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(results shown in an online appendix).  Our baseline model can be 
summarized as follows: 
 
𝐻𝑃௜,௧ =   𝛽ଵ + 𝛽ଶ𝑦௜,௧ିଵ + 𝛽ଷ𝑝𝑜𝑝௜,௧ିଵ +  𝛽ସ ∑𝑋௜,௧ିଵ +  𝛽ହ ∑𝑌௜,௧ିଵ +  𝛽଺ ∑𝑍௧ +  𝜀௜.௧  
 
All of our variables, except for the capital account openness index, central 
bank independence (CBI), and government partisanship, are differenced, as 
panels exhibit either consistently increasing or decreasing trends, rather than 
stochastic processes required by time series.  𝐻𝑃௜,௧  is real housing price growth 
(percentage change9 from the previous year) in country i in year t. 𝑦௜,௧ିଵ is per 
capita real income growth (percentage change from the previous year) in 
country i in year t-1.  𝑝𝑜𝑝௜,௧ିଵ, a rough proxy of housing stock demand, is 
population growth (percentage change from the previous year) in country i in 
year t-1.   Real housing price data (private dwellings) stem from OECD 
(2012a), except for Austria and Portugal (OECD data missing), whose 
residential property price data came from the Bank of International 
Settlements (2014).  Population and real income growth data stem from the 
OECD (2014). 
 
∑𝑋௜,௧ିଵ   is a vector of lagged financial variables.  This includes the lagged real 
interest rate (differenced from the previous year), the lagged ratio of domestic 
credit provided by financial institutions to the private sector as a ratio of GDP 
(a proxy for financial depth, this ratio is also differenced from the previous 
year), and the lagged capital account openness index (a proxy of financial 
liberalization) for country i in year t-1.  The capital account index measures 
capital and current account restrictions, requirements to surrender export 
proceeds, and the presence of multiple exchange rates: higher values indicate 
greater capital account openness.  Real interest rate data  stems  from  the  EU’s                                                          9 Percentage changes are expressed from 0-100 rather 0-1. 
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AMECO Database (2014), domestic credit ratios from the World Bank (2014), 
and   the   capital   account  openness   index   stems   from  Karcher   and  Steinberg’s  
(2012) revised measure of the Chinn-Ito (2006) index. 
 
∑𝑌௜,௧ିଵ   is a vector of lagged domestic political controls.  We include 
partisanship, the lagged proportion of cabinet seats occupied by right 
parties10, because right parties, given their capital/business leanings, may be 
more prone towards passing mortgage-credit-friendly policies than left 
parties.  We also include the lagged CBI index as a rough proxy for the 
inflation aversion of the domestic central bank.   The presence of a 
supranational central bank (the European Central Bank) within our panel 
poses some problems for comparing EMU to non-EMU countries: the ECB 
does not have the same inflation monitoring power for individual Eurozone 
countries as national central banks do.  Therefore, we weight the CBI index by 
the   proportion   of   national   GDP   to   the   central   bank’s   jurisdiction.11  For 
countries with their own central banks, this weight equals 1 (national GDP is 
the   central   bank’s   jurisdiction).      For   EMU   countries,   this  weight   equals   the  
ratio   of   national   output   to   the   Eurozone’s   output.      Partisanship   data   stems  
from Swank (2006), while the CBI index stems from Cukierman (1992), with 
updated  data  from  Polillo  and  Gullién  (2005).    EMU  country’s  output  weights  
to Eurozone GDP are calculated using data from the EU AMECO Database 
(2014).       
 
∑𝑍௧ is a vector of (n-1) year dummies to control for omitted time shocks.  
Optimally, our analysis would include measures of national policies towards 
mortgage debt accumulation (mortgage tax subsidies, maximum loan to value                                                         10 Our results remain unchanged if we use the proportion of legislative seats occupied by right parties. 11 Our results remain unchanged if we do not weight the CBI index. 
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ratios, etc.).  However this data is not available on a consistent time series 
basis.  OECD (2011) possesses cross-sectional data on mortgage tax subsidies 
for 2009 only and maximum loan-to-value ratios for 1990 and 2000 only.  
Therefore, we omitted these variables from our regressions, although we 
incorporate them into our case study analysis, where we tease out the causal 
mechanism.  Finally, all independent variables, but not our dependent 
variable, are standardized making it possible to compare the impact 
magnitudes of the independent variables on housing price growth (beta 
coefficients  are  interpreted  as  “a  one  standard  deviation  change  in  X  leads  to  a  
𝛽%  change  in  housing  prices”).  
We begin our analysis with a standard OLS estimator with country clustered 
standard errors to control for contemporaneous correlation and panel 
heteroskedasticity.12  A distributive lag model should blunt the likelihood of 
reverse causality between housing price and income growth: present housing 
prices should not influence past income growth.  However, if housing price 
shocks linger for more than one period, endogeneity between these two 
variables may continue to exist.  Therefore, we use instrumental variable 
regression (IV or two stage least squares, 2SLS), using lagged (n-1) 
coordination regime dummies (pattern bargaining, state-imposed 
coordination, state-led wage pacts, no coordination, and peak-level 
bargaining,13 with non-state-led wage pacts as the omitted baseline category) 
as instruments for lagged income growth.14   Because we select non-state-led 
wage pacts as the baseline category, identified by some as the regime that best                                                         12 A Wooldridge test for auto-correlation (F-statistic of 66.60, p-value=0.000) and an LR test of panel heteroskedasticity (Chi-squared statistic of 71.51, p-value=0.000) for Model I in Table 1 suggest that both first order serial correlation and panel heteroskedasticity are present in the baseline model.  13 Our results below remain consistent when we differentiate between sheltered vs exposed sector dominated peak-level bargaining.    14 We also estimated our baseline model with the Arellano–Bond (1991) general method of moments estimator.  Though this estimator is more appropriate for panels where cross-sectional units outnumber time units, it produced results similar to those in Tables 1 and 2. 
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enhances   the   sheltered   sector’s   political   bargaining   power   (Brandl,   2012;  
Johnston et al, 2014), it is possible that all our coordination regime dummies 
will be significantly negative in the first stage. Our coordination regime data 
for 1980-2003 and 2004-2007 stem from Brandl (2012) and Johnston et al 
(2014), respectively.   
 
In order to act as suitable instruments, our coordination dummies must be 
relevant (significantly correlated with income growth), and exogenous (not 
correlated with the error term in the second stage regression).  First stage 
results assessing the influence of coordination regimes on real income growth 
are jointly significant, validating the first requirement.  We present the joint F-
test of significance, and in all models, the F-statistic exceeds 10, the threshold 
which distinguishes between weakly significant (<10) and strongly significant 
(>10) instruments (Stock and Yogo, 2005).  Though we assume that wage 
coordination   regimes’   influence   on   housing   prices   operates   solely through 
their effect on income growth, it is impossible to be completely sure that our 
instruments are fully exogenous as one cannot formally test this.  However, 
given the inclusion of various controls, we account for omitted variables that 
may cause our instruments to be endogenous to housing price growth, 
increasing the probability of their exogeneity.  Export-friendly coordination 
regimes may be more typical of governments with greater inflation aversion 
or resistance towards credit expansion, both of which have important 
implications for housing prices.  However, the CBI index proxies as a 
country’s   central   bank’s   aversion   to   inflation.      Additionally,   by   including  
cabinet right-party share and the expansion of the ratio of domestic credit 
provision to GDP in our models, we also control for possible partisan 
determinants of inflation/credit expansion, highlighted in the CPE literature. 
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Finally, both our OLS and IV estimators include random effects rather than 
country-specific effects.  While these dummies control for omitted time-
invariant country effects (although such omitted variables are more pressing 
for level effects, rather than differenced/growth-rate effects, which our models 
estimate), their incorporation into the IV/2SLS analysis is problematic for the 
coordination regime dummies, as well as for the CBI index.  Some countries 
(Canada, the UK and the US) exhibit no change in their coordination regimes 
over the entire period, meaning that their country dummies would be 
perfectly correlated with their coordination regimes (see Plümper et al, 2005, 
for a general critique on the use of fixed effects when incorporating 
institutional controls).15  This is substantiated in our regression output: in our 
IV/2SLS regressions, the inclusion of country dummies rendered the 
coordination regime dummies insignificant in the first stage (results available 
in an online appendix). 
 
However, realizing that income growth and mortgage credit demand may 
serve as substitutes rather than complements for credit-permissive liberal 
market economies16 (the UK and US) where mortgage securitization was 
central to their growth regimes (Hay 2009), we introduce US and UK country 
dummy interactions with lagged income growth in the OLS model to 
determine  if  income’s  effect  on  housing  prices  for  these  economies  is  different  
to the wider OECD sample.                                                           15 If we incorporate a full list of (n-1) country dummies within our OLS estimator, which does not incorporate the coordination regime dummies, our results in Table 1 remain unchanged (results available in an online appendix).    16 Canada and Australia are stark contrasts to credit-permissive liberal-market economies.  The 
former’s	   financial	   sector	  was resilient to the 2008 financial crisis, given its higher (pre-crisis) capital requirements and greater leverage restrictions.  Due to tighter regulations (Canadian banks cannot offer mortgages with less than 5% down), only 3% of Canadian mortgages were subprime in 2005, compared to 15% in the US (Haltom, 2013).  Australia also weathered the 
2008	   financial	   crisis	   well,	   given	   its	   banking	   sector’s	   cautious	   approach	   to	   home	   lending	   and	  limited, little history with subprime lending. Australian banks were encouraged by government policy to avoid risky loans (Hill, 2012).         
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Results 
 
Table 1 presents our results for the OLS estimator.  Our baseline model 
(Model I, Table 1) excludes the capital account openness index, as this 
variable is largely absent for Belgium, which would exclude it from our 
sample.  Model II in Table 1 includes the capital account openness index.  
Model III, Table 1, includes our domestic political controls.  Model IV 
presents results for the US and UK country dummy interactions with lagged 
income growth.  Model V presents results for a two year, rather than one year, 
lag of the independent variables.  Model VI presents an alternative measure of 
income growth that examines the extent to which wage growth in the 
sheltered non-market services sector (a weighted composite of public 
administration and defence, education, and health/social work) exceeds wage 
growth in the manufacturing sector (data stemming from EU KLEMS, 2010).  
Coordination regimes that grant the export sector or the state greater political 
leverage in wage bargaining tend to exhibit smaller or negative values in 
wage growth differentials between the non-market services and 
manufacturing sector, while those that grant unions in the non-tradable 
sectors greater bargaining power tend to exhibit larger differentials.  
Therefore, if this variable is high (non-market services wage growth outpaces 
that in the manufacturing sector), housing price growth, driven by sheltered 
sector wage inflation, should increase.            
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Table 1: OLS estimates for the determinants of real housing price growth Standardized Independent Variables I II III IV V V Population Growth (t-1) 0.226 0.252 0.267 0.333   0.564**   (0.251) (0.250) (0.265) (0.306)   (0.224) 
Δ	  Real	  Interest	  Rate	  (t-1) -0.696** -0.720** -0.716** -0.78***   -0.663*   (0.279) (0.301) (0.301) (0.301)   (0.350) 
Δ	  Private	  Credit	  to	  GDP	  (t-1) 0.337 0.315 0.313 0.274   0.424   (0.242) (0.257) (0.257) (0.247)   (0.327) Real Income Growth (t-1) 3.043*** 3.062*** 3.082*** 3.106***       (0.406) (0.381) (0.382) (0.404)     Capital Account Liberalization   -0.368 -0.295 -0.442   -0.774 Index (t-1)   (0.476) (0.483) (0.462)   (0.496) Proportion of Cabinet Seats      -0.251 -0.309   -0.094 occupied by right parties (t-1)     (0.349) (0.358)   (0.363) Weighted CBI (t-1)     -0.004 0.031   -0.214       (0.422) (0.440)   (0.571) US Dummy    -0.160       (0.590)   UK Dummy    2.225***       (0.420)   US* Real Income Growth (t-1)    -2.16***       (0.559)   UK* Real Income Growth (t-1)    0.621       (0.751)   Difference in Non-Market Services and           0.572* Manufacturing Sector wage growth (t-1)          (0.318) Population Growth (t-2)        0.355**            (0.149)   
Δ	  Real	  Interest	  Rate	  (t-2)        -0.698*            (0.396)   
Δ	  Credit	  Growth	  (t-2)        0.07            (0.297)   Real Income Growth (t-2)        1.880***            (0.396)   Capital Account Liberalization        0.35   Index (t-2)        (0.498)   Proportion of Cabinet Seats         -0.443   occupied by right parties (t-2)        (0.359)   Weighted CBI (t-2)        0.037            (0.459)   Constant 2.895*** 3.123*** 3.118*** 3.216*** 3.445*** 3.552***   (0.900) (0.863) (0.918) (0.867) (0.961) (1.029) N 428 410 410 410 395 408 R-squared (overall) 0.396 0.397 0.398 0.410 0.319 0.272 Dependent variable is real housing price growth.  Independent variables are standardized, dependent variable is non-standardized. Estimator used was a pooled cross-sectional, time series, random effects OLS estimator for 17 OECD economies from 1980 to 2007.  N-1 time dummies included but not shown.  Panel clustered standard errors provided in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at a 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence level.  
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Only two variables, real income growth and real interest rate reductions, are 
consistently significant within our OLS estimates, regardless of the lag 
structure used. Both exhibit the anticipated relationships (lagged income 
growth is positively associated with housing price growth, while lagged real 
interest rates reductions are associated with housing price increases).  Income 
growth’s   beta   coefficient,   however,   exhibits a much larger magnitude than 
changes in the real interest rate: a one-standard deviation increase in lagged real 
income growth is associated with an annual 3% increase in real housing 
prices, while a one standard deviation decrease in real interest rates is 
associated  with   a   0.7%   annual   housing   price   increase.      Income’s  magnitude  
declines when using a two year lag structure, yet its impact is still more than 
double that of real interest rate movements.   
 
When examining specific income effects for the UK and US (Model IV), the 
former does not exhibit a discernable difference from other OECD economies 
in the impact of lagged income growth on housing prices (given its 
insignificant   interaction   term).      However,   the   US   country   dummy’s  
interaction term is significantly negative, and largely cancels out the 
significantly positive (hierarchal) effect of lagged income growth.  This result 
lends credence to the suggestion that income and (mortgage) credit serve as 
substitutes in the US, but complements throughout the rest of the OECD 
(including the UK).   
 
When income growth is conceptualized in terms of sectoral wage differentials 
(i.e. the scale of sheltered sector wage push compared to that in 
manufacturing), the anticipated relationship was also significant: a one 
standard deviation increase in the lagged gap between sheltered and 
manufacturing sector wage growth, indicating sheltered sector wage push, is 
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associated with a 0.57% annual increase in housing prices.  Our other financial 
variables, credit expansion and the capital account openness index, and 
domestic political controls displayed no significant relationship with housing 
price growth.17 Lagged population growth corresponds with housing price 
growth in only two of the five models (its relationship is most significant in a 
second year lag structure).  
 
According to results in Table 1, lagged income growth demonstrates a much 
stronger relationship with housing price growth than lagged real interest rate 
movements.     However,   income’s   impact  may  be  upwardly  biased   (increases  
in housing prices place upward pressure on income growth, which in turn 
fuels housing prices).  Table 2 presents our IV/2SLS regression results, which 
attempts to control for this.  Model I is the baseline model without the capital 
account openness index.  Model II includes the capital account openness 
index.  Model III includes domestic political controls. In Model IV, Table 2, we 
further lag our coordination dummies: two year lags of the coordination 
regime dummies serve as the instruments for the one year lag of real income 
growth.  We do this in order to determine whether incorporating for 
coordination   regimes’  potentially lagged effects on income growth influences 
income  growth’s  beta  coefficient  in  the  second  stage.                                                                   17 It is unlikely that this is due to imperfect multicollinearity as all independent variables display insignificant or small and weakly significant (pair-wise correlations of less than 0.15) with each other. 
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Table 2: IV/2SLS estimates for the determinants of housing price growth Standardized Independent Variables I II III IV Population Growth (t-1) 0.295 0.396* 0.407* 0.309   (0.219) (0.215) (0.219) (0.205) 
Δ	  Real	  Interest	  Rate	  (t-1) -0.666** -0.695** -0.693** -0.541*   (0.277) (0.304) (0.303) (0.295) 
Δ	  Private	  Credit	  to	  GDP	  (t-1) 0.365 0.377 0.371 0.348   (0.238) (0.267) (0.263) (0.258) Real Income Growth (t-1) 2.273*** 1.655** 1.686* 2.414**   (0.684) (0.826) (0.949) (1.075) Capital Account Liberalization   -0.572 -0.506 -0.116 Index (t-1)   (0.513) (0.543) (0.413) Proportion of Cabinet Seats      -0.168 -0.263 occupied by right parties (t-1)     (0.334) (0.366) Weighted CBI (t-1)     -0.093 -0.019       (0.447) (0.422) Constant 3.009*** 3.451*** 3.386*** 3.079***   (0.825) (0.822) (0.925) (0.849) N 428 410 410 397 R-squared  0.388 0.369 0.371 0.398 First Stage: Dependent variable is standardized real income growth (t-1) Peak level bargaining (t-1) -0.821* -0.993** -0.971**     (0.470) (0.488) (0.476)  Pattern bargaining (t-1) -0.813* -0.933* -0.885*     (0.457) (0.499) (0.481)  State imposed coordination (t-1) -1.041** -1.208*** -1.195***     (0.445) (0.441) (0.431)  State-led wage pacts (t-1) -0.892* -1.015** -1.007**    (0.460) (0.514) (0.503)  No coordination (t-1) -0.807* -0.918* -0.887*     (0.470) (0.518) (0.501)  Peak level bargaining (t-2)       -1.122**      (0.448) Pattern bargaining (t-2)       -1.004**      (0.434) State imposed coordination (t-2)       -1.383***      (0.410) State-led wage pacts (t-2)       -1.073**     (0.448) No coordination (t-2)       -0.975**      (0.456) N 428 410 410 397 R-squared  0.3987 0.4121 0.4144 0.4424 F-test of joint instrument significance 28.03*** 31.73*** 34.43*** 23.01*** Dependent variable is real housing price growth.  Independent variables in the second stage are standardized. Estimator used was a pooled cross-sectional time series random effects IV/2SLS estimator for 17 OECD economies from 1980 to 2007.  N-1 time dummies included but not shown.  For first stage regressions, non-instrument independent variables and constant term not shown.  Panel clustered standard errors provided in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at a 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence level.  
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Table 2, first stage estimates conform largely to our hypotheses.  Pattern 
bargaining, state imposed coordination, and state-led wage pacts exhibited 
lower annual real wage growth, on average, than the baseline category (non-
state-led wage pacts).  The other two coordination regimes also exhibited 
significantly (although for uncoordinated regimes, weakly significant) lower 
annual wage growth than non-state-led wage pacts: note that these wage 
pacts impose the least constraints on sheltered sector unions.  When 
distinguishing between sheltered and export sector dominated peak 
bargaining   regimes,   peak   level   bargaining’s   negative   coefficient  was   largely  
driven by the latter. 
 
The impact of lagged real income growth on changes in real housing prices is 
reduced in the IV regressions.  However, the magnitude of lagged income 
growth’s   impact   remains   substantial,   and   continues   to   exceed   the   predicted  
effects of changes in lagged real interest rate.  According to results in Table 2, 
a one standard deviation increase in lagged real income is associated with a 
1.6-2.4% annual increase in housing prices, while the impact of a lagged one 
standard deviation decrease in real interest rates is associated with only a 0.6-
0.7% annual increase in housing prices.  Similar to the OLS models, financial 
and other domestic political variables displayed no significant association 
with housing prices.    
 
Results in Tables 1 and 2 provide robust empirical evidence of the primacy of 
income   growth’s   influence   on   housing   prices.      Income exhibited the largest 
impact on housing price growth of all variables examined, although its impact 
was negligible for the US, even when attempting to correct for endogeneity 
via instrumental variables.  While the impact of changes in real interest rates 
was also significant, its magnitude was nowhere near that of income growth.  
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Finally, variables measuring broader trends in financial liberalization and 
financial depth displayed no significant effect.  To better assess how these 
wage-setting regimes, and their underlying sectoral class politics, influence 
housing prices, we examine the causal mechanisms underlying the statistical 




Primed for housing bubbles: A comparison of Ireland and 
the Netherlands    
Ireland and the Netherlands provide a useful (method of difference) case 
study design to examine the influence of wage-setting institutions on housing 
bubbles.  During the 1990s, both countries had similar trajectories in their 
housing markets.  Ireland and the Netherlands had the largest housing price 
increases in nominal and real terms in the OECD.  Between 1990 and 2000, 
nominal/real housing prices increased by 173%/112% in the Netherlands and 
170%/99% in Ireland (OECD, 2012).  Yet while both countries experienced 
significant housing prices growth during the 1990s, they experienced 
divergent real-estate price trends during the (pre-financial crisis) 2000s.  In 
Ireland, housing price growth turned into a bubble between 2002 and 2007. 
Nominal housing prices grew by 105%, the third highest in the OECD.  The 
Netherlands, on the other hand, witnessed a lull in housing price growth. 
Between 2002 and 2007, nominal housing prices grew by only 45%, ranking 
15th in the OECD housing price growth, whereas real housing price growth in 
the   Netherlands   for   the   same   period   was   roughly   a   third   of   Ireland’s   (see  
Figure 5).   
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Figure 5: Real housing price index for Ireland and the Netherlands (1980-
2007) 
 Housing price data from the OECD (2012a)  
Why  did  Ireland’s  rapid  increase in housing prices during the 1990s turn into 
a bubble whereas it did not in the Netherlands? Several supply-side and 
demand-side determinants can be ruled out given that both countries shared 
these characteristics.  Both Ireland and the Netherlands realized a reduction in 
their nominal interest rates during the 1990s. Both countries also witnessed 
employment/growth miracles in the late 1990s and early 2000s, stimulating 
domestic demand. Much of the Dutch employment miracle concentrated in 
part-time employment, with a significant proportion of married women 
entering the part-time labor force (Salverda, 2005).  Yet the deregulation of 
Dutch mortgage lending matched these part-time employment trends, 
making it possible for (part-time) second household incomes to qualify for 
loan-to-income mortgage limits (Schwartz and Seabrook, 2008).      
 
Other supply-side determinants of housing prices that differ between the two 
countries can also be ruled out, as they suggest that a housing bubble should 
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have emerged in the Netherlands rather than Ireland. First, the Netherlands 
has one of the most generous housing credit markets in the OECD.  In 2000, 
the Netherlands had the highest maximum loan-to-value ratios in the OECD: 
the maximum loan a buyer could take out in the Netherlands was 115% of the 
home’s   value,   compared   to   a   maximum   limit   of   90%   in   Ireland   (Andrews,  
Caldera Sánchez, and Johansson, 2011).18  Though maximum loan-to-value 
ratios may not suitably gauge credit generosity, as such values are limited to a 
country’s  least  risky  homebuyers,  similar  dynamics  emerge  when  examining  
typical/average loan-to-value ratios.  In 2002, the Dutch typical loan-to-value 
ratio   was   90%,   growing   to   115%   by   2008,   well   above   Ireland’s   66%   ratio  
(Schwartz and Seabrooke, 2008; Vandevyvere and Zenthӧfer, 2012).   
 
The Netherlands also has the most generous tax relief on mortgage interest in 
the OECD.  In 2009, the gap between the market interest rate on (prime) home 
loans and the after-tax debt financing costs of homeownership was just over 
1.6%, compared to 0.3% in Ireland (OECD, 2011).  Rent control is also stricter 
in the Netherlands than in Ireland, due to the presence of a large rental sector 
that is dominated by social housing (OECD, 2011).  These restrictions should 
favor substitution away from rental properties towards home-ownership.  
Additionally, housing stock growth in the Netherlands was modest and kept 
pace with population growth (Cunha, Lambrecht, and Pawlina, 2009).  All of 
these supply-side factors suggest that leading into the 2008 global financial 
crisis, the Dutch housing market should have been more bubble prone than 
Ireland’s.  Yet  after  the  early  2000s,  Dutch  housing  prices  flat-lined, while Irish 
housing prices continued to grow.                                                         18 High loan-to-value ratios should indicate that Dutch borrowers may be more prone towards default.  However, unlike the US mortgage market, the passing on of credit risk through mortgage securitization was comparatively rare in the Netherlands, which explains why monitoring problems behind home finance have not been so severe in the country and why lending standards have not been loosened in the 2000s (Cunha, Lambrecht, and Pawlina, 2009).   
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One crucial difference between Ireland and the Netherlands that may explain 
their diverging housing price dynamics (and mortgage-demand expansion) in 
the mid-2000s was how wage-setting institutions influenced income dynamics 
in both countries.  Both Ireland and the Netherlands entered EMU with labor 
market shortages, and these shortages placed upwards pressures on wages.   
By 2001, both countries arrived at a price spiral juncture; Ireland possessed 
the highest inflation rate in EMU, and the Netherlands possessed the third 
highest (OECD, 2014).  What differed between these two countries, which had 
significant implications for income growth from 2002 onwards, and in turn 
demand for housing prices, was the domestic political response to these 
inflation dynamics.  
 
In the Netherlands, the 2001 inflation rate of 4.2%, precipitated an acute sense 
of crisis; the country prided itself on its low inflation rates and it had not 
witnessed inflation higher than 4% since 1982 (OECD, 2014).  Prompted by 
government action, trade unions and employers immediately agreed to a 
wage ceiling in late 2002, and wage freezes for 2004 and 2005 (Grünell, 2002; 
Van het Kaar, 2003).  These wage pacts slowed income growth in the country 
considerably, and nominal hourly wage growth in the non-market sheltered 
sectors (public administration and defense, healthcare and social work, and 
education) declined from 5.3% in 2001 to 1.7% by 2005, see Figure 6).  Such 
wage dynamics have conspicuous correlations with the lull in Dutch housing 
price growth.         
Alison Johnston and Aidan Regan 
35         
Figure 6: Hourly Nominal Wage Growth in the Manufacturing and the 
(Sheltered) Non-Market Services Sectors (1990-2007) 
 Wage data from EU KLEMS (2010).  Manufacturing sector is International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) D.  Non-Market sector is a weighted composite of public administration and defence (ISIC L), education (ISIC M), and health and social work (ISIC N).  
 
In   Ireland   the   opposite   occurred.   In   the   early   2000’s   the   government   and  
public   sector   unions   established   “The   Public   Service   Benchmarking   Body” to 
analyze the public-private pay differential. The government granted a wage 
increase, from 2003-2005, a once off payment that averaged 8.9% across the 
public sector. This was in addition to the national wage agreement, which 
granted a 12% increase during the period 2003-2005. A special review body 
was also established which granted further increases to senior public-sector 
employees. All of this was in addition to cuts in income tax, which further 
increased the after-tax wage. Quite unlike what occurred in the Netherlands, 
nominal wage growth in the sheltered domestic sectors increased from 7.4% in 
2001 to 11.4% in 2003, reaching 9.5% in 2005. Such wage dynamics have a 
conspicuous correlation with the rapid expansion of credit that funded 
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credit expansion and rising inflation. The Dutch responded by imposing a 
wage freeze. Ireland responded by expanding income growth.  
 
Avoiding  a  bubble:  Dutch  corporatism’s  success  in  income  moderation 
 
The Netherlands entered the 2000s with one of its largest spikes in nominal 
and real housing prices.  Though inflation was low, Dutch unions embarked 
on a wage push that led to the doubling of inflation within a year.  This wage 
push was initiated by the public sector union Abva-Kabo, which represented 
almost  30%  of  the  Federation  Dutch  Labor  Movement’s  (FNV’s)  membership  
(Visser, 2000).  In the 1980s and early 1990s, the Dutch government imposed 
severe moderated wage growth in the public sector.  In 1998, Abva-Kabo 
declared that it would seek wage gains to compensate for these 
developments, and entered the 1998 bargaining round with a 5% target.  By 
2001, Abva-Kabo successfully concluded agreements that were only 0.2% 
below this benchmark.  While FNV called for a moderate 3.5% nominal wage 
growth target in 1998, Abva-Kabo encouraged its affiliates to push higher, 
especially in the healthcare and education sectors where labor shortages were 
acute.   
 
By mid-2001, wage increases were notably high in the social care and welfare 
sector, whose workers received annual wage increases of 7.5% and 5.25% 
respectively (EIRR, 2001).  Abva-Kabo’s  wage  push  campaign  did  not  confine  
itself  to  the  public  sector.    Given  the  union’s  representative  power  within  the  
FNV, its leaders also successfully pressured the Confederal FNV leadership to 
increase their general wage targets and abandon their traditional wage 
formula of setting wage increases in line with inflation and productivity 
developments (Van der Meer et al, 2005).  Agreements concluded in 2001 
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provided  for  an  average  pay  increase  of  4.5%  (higher  than  FNV’s  4%  target),  
and in services the average increase was 5.3% (Van het Kaar, 2001).   
 
By 2001, it was apparent to Dutch employers that wage inflation was leading 
the country to competitive decline.  Abva-Kabo, and its counter-part in the 
Federation of Christian Trade Unions (CNV), successfully used their 
representative strength to dominate peak-level pay setting policies.  The 
critical turning point in Dutch collective bargaining came after the 2002 
election. The election brought the return of a business-friendly center-right 
coalition, led by Jan-Peter   Balkenende’s   Christian   Democrats,   into  
government.19  Balkenende’s   reformist   agenda   became   a   crucial   negotiating  
tool, and enabled government to persuade the FNV and CNV to agree to 
nation-wide wage restraint. In November, 2002, a centrally agreed wage 
ceiling of 2.5% was agreed upon by both FNV and CNV.  In 2003, 
Government again convinced the unions to produce a second national wage 
pact, in return for several concessions on its social policy reform proposals.  In 
October, 2003, the Dutch social partners agreed to a two year wage freeze in 
2004 and 2005.   
 
These three incomes policies facilitated considerable downward adjustments 
in Dutch wage growth.  By 2001, Dutch nominal hourly wage growth was 
5.3%, the highest level since 1982.  After the imposition of the 2.5% nominal 
wage ceiling in 2003, and wage freezes in 2004 and 2005, nominal hourly 
wage growth declined to 1.68% in 2005, its lowest level since 1984 (EU 
KLEMS, 2010).  These national wage pacts overlapped with the slowing of 
Dutch housing prices in the early 2000s (see Figure 5).  While the Netherlands’  
                                                        
19 Balkenende’s  first  coalition,  with  the  populist  Pim  Fortuyn  List  (LFP)  party  and  the  liberals  (VVD)  
collapsed in November, 2002, due to internal conflicts within LFP.  Elections in January, 2003 brought 
the return of CDA to government, with the VVD and the progressive liberals (D-66). 
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generous policies towards mortgage credit accumulation did not change 
during the 2000s, the production of three national wage pacts led to a 
prominent decline in income growth, reducing the capacity of households to 
accumulate financial assets and to leverage housing wealth.  In resorting back 
to a coordinated bargaining framework, albeit temporarily, that reduced 
income growth in its inflationary non-tradable sectors, the Dutch were able to 
reduce   households’   consumption   on   large   durable   assets,   slowing housing 
prices in the early 2000s.  
 
Fuelling  the  bubble:  Irish  corporatism’s  inability  to  moderate  incomes 
 
From  the  late  1980s  to  1990’s  Ireland  instituted  a  centralized  wage  bargaining  
regime aimed at generating national competitiveness via coordinated public 
and private sector wage restraint (Regan 2012).  Wage restraint, flexible labor 
markets and low corporate taxes generated a distinct export led growth 
model   that   became   colloquially   known   as   the   “Celtic   Tiger”.   By   1999,   in   a  
context of rapid economic and employment growth, public sector unions in 
the health, administrative and educational sectors, in launched a wage push 
campaign.  Their wage drive gathered popular support after various teaching, 
nursing and police officer strikes. They also gathered broad political support 
from larger industrial and private-sector unions. All unions agreed that the 
EMU was driving up domestic inflation and needed to be compensated with 
wage increases.  
 
In 1999 a centre-right coalition, led by a populist Fianna Fáil (FF) government, 
negotiated a three-year wage pact called the Programme for Prosperity and 
Fairness (PPF). This was the first wage-pact negotiated in the absence of 
external exchange rate pressure, and based around a very generous national 
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tax-based incomes policy. PPF granted a 15.5% wage increase that averaged 
5.5%   per   annum   from   1999   to   2002.   It   also   granted   a   once   off   ‘catch   up’  
increase  of  3%  to  teachers  and  civil  servants.  In  addition  it  “guaranteed”  that  
net take-home pay of all workers would increase by 25% after cuts in income 
tax.   But   most   controversially,   the   PPF   established   a   “Public Service 
Benchmarking  Body” (PSBB), designed to review public sector pay and assess 
whether there was a growing wage differential between the public and 
private sector. 
 
PPF was widely endorsed by the affiliates to the union confederation, ICTU. 
But from 2000-2002, wage-drift  became  widespread.  ICTU  and  Ireland’s  major  
employers’   associations,   particularly   in   construction,   were   unable   to  
discipline affiliated wage-setters at company or sectoral level. Wage inflation 
was at double-digit figures and public sector employees increasingly 
maintained that despite the generous terms of the PPF they were being left 
behind. In late 2002, and within this context, the PSBB reported its findings. It 
agreed with the professional associations in the public sector (and the FF 
government) that there was a growing pay differential, and recommended the 
government grant an average 9-11% pay increase to all public sector workers 
in addition to the PPF.  
 
The PSBB covered 60% of the total public sector workforce. The first payment 
was sanctioned in May 2003, with the final phase paid in May 2005. The cost 
of PSBB was estimated at 1.1bn per annum or 3.5% of then net current 
government expenditure. Remarkably the findings and methodology of the 
report was never published (data was exempt from the provisions of the 
Freedom of Information Act), and its conclusions have since been falsified. In 
effect the PSBB was a political exercise by the FF government and the social 
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partners to end longstanding wage disputes within the public sector. The PPF 
agreed to a cumulative increase of between 18% and 21% over three years, 
whilst benchmarking added an additional 8.9%-25%. 
 
In 2003 the government and social partners negotiated another national wage 
pact  called  “Sustaining  Progress” (SP). SP granted an additional 13% increase 
to be paid within the 2003-2005 period. In the same year, a special review 
body for higher-paid public sector employees granted additional increases to 
senior civil servants, the judiciary, and government ministers.   The outcome 
of the two wage pacts, the PSBB, and the special review body was a 
substantial increase in the public sector pay bill during the period 2001-2005, 
particularly at the top of the income distribution. The public sector wage 
premium, after controlling for all relevant characteristics such as age and 
education, grew from 7.7% in 2001 (before PSBB was paid) to 23.5% in 2006 
(Kelly et al 2008). All of this increase in income conspicuously overlaps with 
the spike in house prices from 2003-2005 onwards. Rising household income 
preceded the peak of the credit expansion boom, which funded the property 
bubble.  
 
Most analyses (see Kelly, 2009, for a definitive account) assume that bank 
lending alone explains the housing price bubble. Rising wage income is 
considered a symptom of this credit expansion. But this supply-side analysis 
misses the importance of where demand for credit is coming from. The rapid 
increase in public sector wages, particularly for high earners, preceded the 2005 
credit boom. If credit expansion alone explains the house price bubble it 
would imply that had the government intervened to restrict loan-to-value 
ratios it could have been avoided. But the Dutch case contradicts this 
possibility. From 2001-2005 private sector credit, as a ratio of GDP, was 
actually higher in the Netherlands than in Ireland (World Bank, 2014). The 
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divergence in bank lending occurred after 2005. At the same time, from 2001-
2005, Irish house prices increased by over 45% whereas they stabilized at a 
10% in the Netherlands. What differed between the two countries was not 
credit supply but wage restraint.   In line with our income and mortgage credit 
as  “complements”  hypothesis,  the  lull  in  Dutch  incomes  corresponded  with  a  
lull in Dutch  housing  prices  during   the   2000s,  while   Ireland’s   income  boom  
corresponded with its housing bubble. 
 
Income restraint was made possible in the Netherlands because of 
coordinated wage-setting institutions that prioritized the sectoral-class 
interests of an export-led political coalition. Social partners collectively 
reduced income growth and tamed the demand for credit. The opposite 
occurred in Ireland. Centralized wage setting became decoupled from the 
export economy, which operated autonomously from the wage bargaining 
process. Domestic banking interests dominated employer associations whilst 
the construction industry was closely connected to the FF government. 
Simultaneously, the trade union movement was dominated by the public 
sector. The outcome was a centralized wage bargaining regime built around a 
political coalition in the domestic non-tradable sectors, which failed to deliver 
wage  moderation,  thereby  helping  to  fuel  a  credit  boom  that  fed  the  country’s  
housing bubble.             
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Conclusion  
 
Our results suggest that income growth, and the wage-setting institutions that 
govern it, exhibit greater power in explaining housing price growth than 
broader financial variables.  While our interactive model indicates that 
income   growth’s   impact   on   housing prices in the US is minimal, lagged 
income growth is strongly correlated with housing price increases in other 
OECD economies, suggesting that income and mortgage credit may be 
complements. This is not to suggest the credit expansion does not matter, but 
that mortgage demand is more amplified by the impact of an income shock. 
In the midst of international trends, which have made mortgage debt 
instruments more plentiful and cheaper, countries with wage setting 
institutions led by the export sector, continued to experience moderated 
housing price growth. Countries with wage setting institutions that were 
shaped by non-tradable sectors, on the other hand, were more prone towards 
the devastating housing bubbles outlined in the IPE literature.   
 
Our results suggest that in an age of global finance, domestic sectoral-class 
politics continue to exert an important influence on macroeconomic 
outcomes. Financial liberalization and the international mobility of capital 
have substantially increased the price elasticity of the supply of debt 
instruments, granting significant power to banks in extending (mortgage) 
credit. But contrary to these broader international financial trends, demand 
for borrowing, which revolves around income growth, remains deeply 
ingrained in domestic political economies.  Most policy discussion in the 
aftermath of the crises has focused on the role of the state in regulating credit 
supply. Our research suggests that state intervention in shaping and 
coordinating the outcomes of wage outcomes is also crucial, especially 
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outside of the US.  Though capital mobility and financial liberalization have 
worsened the exposure of domestic economies to financial volatility, wage 
coordination regimes that are led by political coalitions in the export sector 
may blunt some of the worst effects of these trends, thereby insulating these 
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Appendix A: Sectoral Wage Coordination Regimes for 17 OECD Countries (1980-2007) 
 Export-Sector Favoring Sheltered-Sector Favoring 
Country Pattern bargaining State-imposed State-led wage pacts Peak bargaining 
Non-state-led wage 
pacts Uncoordinated 
Australia 1981-1982 1980 1983-1992 1993-1996 (E)   1997-2007 
Austria 1984-2007     1980-1983 (E)     
Belgium   1982-1985 1994-2007 1980 (S), 1986-1993 (S) 1981   
Canada           1980-2007 
Denmark 1981-1982 1980, 1985-1987, 1998 2000 1983-1984 (E), 1988-1997 (E), 1999 (E), 2001-2007 (E)     
Finland     1981-1982, 1988-1993, 1995-2000, 2002-2006 1983-1988 (E), 2001 (E) 2007 (E)   1980, 1994 
France 1980-2007           
Germany 
1980-1985, 1987-1999, 2001-2007     1986 (E), 2000 (E)     
Ireland       1981-1986 (S) 1980, 1987-2007   
Italy   1985   1980-1982 (S), 1986-1988 (S), 1990-1991 (S), 1994-2007 (S) 1983-1984, 1989, 1992-1993   
Japan 1980-2007           
The Netherlands   1980-1981 1982-1984, 1993-1995, 2002-2004 1985-1992 (E), 1996-2001 (E), 2005-2007 (E)     
Portugal   1980-1981   1982-1985 (S), 1989 (S), 1991 (S), 1993-1995 (S), 1998-2005 (S), 2007 (S) 1986-1988, 1990, 1992, 1996-1997, 2006   
Spain        1980-1981 (S), 1986-2007 (S) 1982-1985   
Sweden  1999-2007    1980-1994  (E)   1995-1998  United Kingdom           1980-2007 
United States           1980-2007 E indicates export-dominated (peak bargaining).  S indicates sheltered-dominated (peak bargaining). 1980-2003 data from Brandl (2012).  2004-2007 data from Johnston et al, 2014. 
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